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ABSTRACT 
 
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory 
in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against 
corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as 
“cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the 
“duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers 
(“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this 
problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in 
which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately 
and consider only its own interests in doing so. 
In this Response to that article, I further explore the assumptions 
underlying Professor Squire’s claims. I also explore the complexities 
associated with implementing a segmented settlement scheme because such a 
scheme is not consistent with the existing policy language or common law 
that has developed. Under the existing policy language, insurers are only 
contractually obligated to contribute to settlements that are reasonable based 
upon the policyholder’s expected liability at trial. Consequently, the policy 
language regarding settlements would need to be rewritten to allow insurers to 
consider only their own financial interests when deciding whether to settle. In 
addition, in order to implement a segmented settlement scheme, the 
exhaustion requirement that currently exists in many excess policies would 
need to be removed to allow insurers to settle for less than their full policy 
limits. Such changes would have a dramatic impact on the structure of 
insurance programs and the risk transferring function of insurance because 
excess insurers’ exposure would increase while policyholders may be forced to 
become self-insured and fund significant portions of settlements. Such 
changes would also create some practical difficulties regarding the trials of 
cases in which the policyholder settled but some of the insurers had not 
because such cases would proceed without a defendant, the policyholder. The 
Response closes by addressing the issue of whether segmented settlements 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
N his recent article,1 Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory 
in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against 
corporate policyholders are overcompensated under “cramdown” 
settlements. Cramdown settlements are forced on insurers due to what he 
calls a “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and 
officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding 
how this problem could be fixed: “segmented” settlements. 
In essence, Professor Squire claims that the existence of multi-layered 
D&O insurance programs makes policyholders “overeager to settle risky 
lawsuits.”2  Insurers are then forced to settle such lawsuits in “cramdown” 
settlements for more than the lawsuits are actuarially worth, due to an 
obligation he names “the duty to contribute.”3  This dynamic, he further 
claims, causes the overcompensation of the underlying claimants. 4   As a 
result, the real costs of lawsuits against corporate policyholders are 
camouflaged from shareholders in the form of higher premiums charged by 
insurers in an effort to recoup the excessive settlement amounts they are 
forced to pay. 5  Professor Squire then discusses the idea of whether this 
alleged problem could be solved by allowing insurers and policyholders to 
each act in their own self-interest and settle individually with the underlying 
claimants.6  Under this segmented approach to settlements, each party could 
settle for any amount it negotiates. The underlying plaintiffs would then 
proceed to trial only against the parties that had not settled.7 
In his article, Professor Squire offers numerous important insights 
regarding shareholder litigation and collective settlements, such as coining the 
phrase “duty to contribute” to describe insurers’ obligations to contribute to 
settlements that implicate their layers of coverage.8  He is also the first scholar 
to identify the risk stemming from financial incentives that certain excess 
insurers may have to pay more than the actuarial value of cases in certain 
circumstances in order to settle.9  Rather than focus on the contributions 
1  Richard Squire, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (2012). 
2  Id. at 3. 
3  Id. at 4. 
4  Id.  
5  Id. at 6. 
6  Id. at 5. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. at 4.   
9  Id. at 27–29. 
I 
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Professor Squire has made to insurance law scholarship in his article, 
however, this Response addresses the assumptions that underlie Professor 
Squire’s claims and the issues that would arise if a segmented settlement 
scheme were implemented. This Response counsels against the 
implementation of a segmented settlement scheme due to the extensive 
changes to the existing policy language and law that would be required, along 
with the collateral negative consequences that would flow from such a 
scheme. 
This Response is divided into three parts. Part One addresses the claim 
that the “duty to contribute” results in “cramdown” settlements in which 
insurers are forced to settle for unreasonable amounts and the underlying 
claimants are overcompensated as a result. As noted above, Professor Squire 
has identified a theoretical situation that could arise in some circumstances 
where excess insurers may be tempted to pay more than they are contractually 
obligated in order to settle. I seek to demonstrate that, although it is 
theoretically a risk in certain circumstances, in practice the situation does not 
actually occur. 
Part Two addresses the complexities and problems that would be created 
if a segmented settlement scheme were implemented. These problems range 
from the difficulties of conducting “empty chair” trials to the extensive 
changes that would need to be made to the existing policy language and law.  
Part Two also discusses public policy concerns that would be implicated by a 
segmented settlement scheme. Finally, Part Two considers whether the 
benefits of a segmented settlement scheme would outweigh the problems 
such a system would create. 
Part Three addresses whether a segmented settlement scheme would be 
appropriate for other lines of corporate insurance. In discussing this issue, I 
draw upon my own twenty years of experience litigating and trying insurance 
disputes, as well as the case law. I use two actual experiences a Fortune 100 
company had with its insurers regarding product liability claims under 
commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policies to illustrate the 
settlement dynamic that typically occurs.  
 
I. ANALYSIS OF THE RISK OF “CRAMDOWN” SETTLEMENTS AND 
OVERCOMPENSATION OF PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE EXISTING POLICY 
LANGUAGE AND LAW 
 
The central premise of Professor Squire’s article – that policyholders and 
excess insurers are allowed under the existing policy language and law to 
7:589 (2013) Segmented Settlements 593 
“cramdown” unreasonable settlements on primary insurers that results in the 
overcompensation of the underlying claimants – is a completely novel idea 
that demands discussion and consideration. At its core, Professor Squire's 
insight involves recognizing that by forcing a primary insurer to make the 
portion of its limits above its own expected trial liability available for 
settlement, in effect this "duty to contribute" gives the excess insurer the 
"benefit" of that amount to use towards settlement. As a result, the excess 
insurer, acting in its own rational self-interest, may be incentivized to overpay. 
This dynamic is, however, a situation that insurers themselves have 
created under the policy language they drafted. Indeed, the duty to contribute 
is simply the enforcement of the policy language under the specific facts of 
each case. With that said, the actual risk of excess insurers overpaying is, as 
will be shown below, absent as a practical matter and becomes more and 
more remote as a theoretical matter as the plaintiffs’ chances of success 
decrease and/or the policyholder’s potential liability increases beyond its 
coverage limits. 
Under the express terms of D&O policies and many other types of 
excess liability policies, the decision to settle is made by the policyholder.10  
While the policies also require that the policyholder obtain the consent of 
each insurer that would be required to pay any portion of the settlement, 
“such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”11 This means that insurers 
are only required to contribute to reasonable settlements. If the policyholder 
settles for an unreasonable amount, then the insurer is not obligated to 
10  See, e.g., Fuller-Austin Installation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 958, 982 
(2006) (considering a policy which allowed the policyholder to decide whether to settle 
but required the excess insurer’s consent, which means “‘[a]n excess insurance company 
has a duty to accept reasonable settlements on its policyholder's behalf’; ‘[e]ven if an 
excess insurance company has not denied coverage or refused to defend, the insurance 
company has a duty to accept a reasonable settlement’”) (quoting Fuller-Austin 
Installation Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. BC116835, 2002 WL 31005090, at *18 
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2002)); Taylor v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 740, 
747 (Haw. 1999) (“An insurer may not use [a consent-to-settle] clause to block settlement 
unreasonably . . . .”) (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nayerahamadi, 593 F. 
Supp. 216, 218 (E.D. Pa. 1984)); 14 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 203:37 (3d ed. 2011) (“Liability policies typically contain a consent to settle 
clause under which the insured is not permitted to enter into settlement with a tortfeasor 
without the consent of the insurer. Where the policy contains such a clause, the insured's 
failure to obtain prior consent from the insurer constitutes a breach of a condition of the 
insurance contract and thereby forfeits coverage under the policy unless the insured can 
show that the insurer effectively waived the requirement of consent by the insurer's . . . 
unreasonable refusal to consent.”).  
11  E.g., Hilco Capital, LP v. Fed. Ins. Co., 978 A.2d 174, 179 (Del. 2009); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. 
Bear Stearns Cos., 10 N.Y.3d 170, 177 (N.Y. 2008).   
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contribute to it. The question of whether a settlement is reasonable is based 
upon the expected exposure of the policyholder at trial, not each individual 
insurer’s expected exposure.12  With respect to excess insurance and many 
types of liability insurance, such as D&O insurance, this rule of 
“reasonableness” is not a judicial creation under which the policyholder 
defends itself and decides whether to settle. 13  Rather, it is a contractual 
obligation set forth in the very policies that the insurers themselves drafted. 
Thus, by contractually agreeing to consent to settlements that are reasonable, 
insurers have agreed to consider the policyholder’s interests when the 
settlement decision is made, not solely their own financial self-interest.14 
12  See Squire, supra note 1, at 19; Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) 
(finding that, in determining reasonableness, the question to be answered is whether "a 
prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer"); Wierck 
v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990) ("If, but for the policy 
limits, the insurer would settle for an offered amount, it is obligated to do so . . . .”). 
13  Under many types of liability insurance, such as auto insurance and homeowners 
insurance, the insurer has the right and obligation to defend the policyholder and the 
insurer has the right to settle cases asserted against the policyholder. Because the insurer 
controls the defense and settlement decisions under such policies and has the ability to 
place the policyholder's assets at risk for judgments that exceed the policy's limits, the 
insurer is in a fiduciary role with respect to the policyholder. Consequently, courts have 
interpreted the right to settle provisions in such policies to contain an implied duty to act 
fairly and in good faith, which means the insurer must accept reasonable settlement offers 
that are within the policy's limits. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion 
of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1349 
(1994); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1117–26 (1990); PPG 
Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 659 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting) 
(“Pursuant to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied by law in every 
liability insurance policy, the insurer has a duty to make reasonable efforts to settle a claim 
against its insured by the insured's victim – which accords with the public policy favoring 
settlement.") (citations omitted); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 389 (Pa. 2001) 
("Today, we hold that where an insurer acts in bad faith, by unreasonably refusing to settle 
a claim, it breaches its contractual duty to act in good faith and its fiduciary duty to its 
insured."). That is not the situation at issue in Professor Squire’s article or in this 
Response. Unlike policies in which the insurer defends the case and controls the 
settlement decision and courts have created a duty to settle as a fiduciary duty and an 
implied contractual obligation, the obligation to consent to reasonable settlements under 
many excess policies and some lines of liability insurance, such as D&O insurance, is 
specifically set forth in the language of the policies. See Hilco Capital, 978 A.2d at 179; 
Vigilant Ins. Co., 10 N.Y.3d at 177; Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176; Wierck, 456 N.W.2d at 195; 
Squire, supra note 1, at 19. 
14  Professor Squire acknowledges this contractual obligation in his article, but then 
discounts the power of the requirement that a settlement must be reasonable before an 
insurer must consent to it in his analysis by claiming insurers nonetheless are somehow 
forced to settle for presumably unreasonable amounts in what he describes as 
“cramdown” settlements. See Squire, supra note 1, at 19–21, 28. Notably, he does not 
provide any examples of unreasonable "cramdown" settlements that allegedly have 
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Does this contractual arrangement allow excess insurers to “cramdown” 
unreasonable settlements on primary insurers?  No, it actually should prevent 
such occurrences. Does it create a financial incentive for excess insurers to 
overpay in order to settle? Theoretically, yes, in some limited circumstances, 
but in practice, no.  
To understand these answers, consider the simple hypothetical that 
Professor Squire uses in his article.15  A policyholder is facing a claim with $5 
million in damages. The policyholder’s primary insurance has $2 million in 
limits. The excess insurer provides $3 million in limits. There is a 50% chance 
of a defense verdict on liability.  Under this scenario, Professor Squire and I 
both agree that the policyholder’s expected liability would be $2.5 million (0.5 
x $5M = $2.5M).16  Because the primary insurer has contractually agreed to 
pay the first $2 million of the policyholder’s liability, it would be reasonable 
for it to pay the full $2 million of its limits if a reasonable settlement demand 
exceeding $2 million is made and thus, a “cramdown” situation would not 
exist.  Would the primary insurer nonetheless be economically incentivized to 
overpay the plaintiff in order to settle?  No, its maximum liability is capped at 
its policy limit of $2 million so it would have neither a contractual nor an 
economic reason to pay more than $2 million.  
Due to the fact the primary insurer’s expected trial liability would only be 
$1 million (0.5 x $2M (the policy limits) = $1M), but it is required to pay the 
full $2 million of its limits if the case can be settled for the reasonable 
settlement value of $2.5 million, does this system result in the transfer of 
wealth, what Professor Squire refers to as “T” in his formulas,17 from the 
primary insurer to the excess insurer, as Professor Squire suggests? 18  No.  
Under the existing policy language and law, the reasonableness of the 
settlement is based on the overall expected liability of the policyholder, not 
each individual insurer’s expected trial liability. 19   Indeed, due to the 
requirement in excess policies that all of the underlying insurance be 
exhausted before the excess policy has an obligation to pay,20 the primary 
occurred despite the contractual limitation that insurers are only required to pay 
reasonable settlements. 
15  See Squire, supra note 1, at 24–25, 28. 
16  Id. at 25. 
17  See, e.g., id. at 29. 
18  See id. at 29. 
19  See id. at 19; Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Wierck v. Grinnell Mut. 
Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 195 (Iowa 1990). 
20  See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 6:45 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“An excess insurer is liable only to the extent that the covered portions of a judgment or 
settlement exceed the primary insurance.”); Utica Nat’l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. 
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insurer is paid a much higher premium in exchange for its promise to pay its 
full limits if the reasonable settlement value of the case from the 
policyholder’s perspective exceeds the primary policy’s limits.21  Thus, there is 
no transfer of wealth from the primary insurer to the excess insurer. The 
primary insurer contractually agreed to pay more than its expected trial 
liability in order to settle and was paid a premium commensurate with that 
agreement. 
Does the same analysis apply to the excess insurers?  No, they have 
different contractual obligations and financial incentives than the primary 
insurer.  Under this hypothetical, the excess insurer would contractually be 
required to pay $0.5 million to settle because the reasonable settlement value 
of the case is $2.5 million and the primary insurer would be required to pay 
the $2 million limits of its policy if a settlement for $2.5 million were possible.  
Would the excess insurer nonetheless have an economic incentive to pay 
more than $0.5 million to settle if the plaintiff is insisting on more than $2.5 
million to settle?  Theoretically, yes; Professor Squire has identified this as a 
problem.22  Because there is a 50% chance that the excess insurer could be 
required to pay its full limits of $3 million at trial, the excess insurer has an 
expected trial liability of $1.5 million (0.5 x $3M = $1.5M). Thus, although the 
excess insurer would contractually be obligated to pay only $.5 million to 
of N.Y, 812 S.W.2d 656, 659–60 (Tex. App. 1991), writ denied, (Oct. 23, 1991) (explaining 
that excess insurers are not required to pay any amount until primary insurance coverage 
is exhausted); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 1170, 1175–77, (N.D. Ill. 
1995) ("Excess insurance 'kicks in' to provide additional coverage once the policy limits of 
other available insurance are exhausted. . . . The protections of excess insurance does not 
begin until those of the primary policy end; all primary insurance must be exhausted 
before liability is triggered on the excess insurance, regardless of how the excess insurance 
is created. . . . Excess policies . . . are not automatically triggered by an event; they are not 
triggered until underlying insurance is exhausted. By the terms of the policy, an insured is 
not entitled to recover from an excess insurer until underlying insurance is exhausted."). 
21  See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW 976 (5th ed. 2012) (“[P]rimary insurers charge higher premiums than do excess and 
umbrella carriers. In contrast, relieved of primary insurance burdens and shielded from 
frequent losses by the presence of underlying primary insurance, excess and umbrella 
insurers charge relatively low premiums when compared with the amount of risk 
insured."); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and Current 
Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 718 (1989) (“Most major corporations purchase multiple 
layers of excess insurance to cover losses potentially aggregating in the millions of dollars. 
The premium paid by the insured for each successive layer of coverage is normally 
proportionately less expensive than for the immediate underlying layer. The lower 
premium charged for following form excess insurance is based upon both the decreased 
risk of a judgment or settlement within higher layers of coverage and the absence of a 
duty to defend the insured.”) (citations omitted). 
22  See Squire, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
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accomplish a reasonable settlement, it economically would be incentivized to 
pay up to $1.5 million to settle.   
This hypothetical reveals both the strengths and weaknesses in Professor 
Squire’s analysis that lead him to the incorrect conclusion that the current 
rules regarding settlement result in the overcompensation of plaintiffs. 23   
Professor Squire is correct that a temptation to overpay may exist in such 
circumstances;24 however, it is the excess insurer, not the primary insurer, 
which has the financial incentive to pay more to settle when one considers the 
reasonableness of the settlement from the perspective of each insurer’s 
expected trial liability and its existing contractual obligations. The reasonable 
amount for the excess insurer to pay to settle under the current policy 
language and rules would be $0.5 million, where the policyholder’s expected 
trial liability is $2.5 million ($2 million from the primary insurer plus $0.5 
million from the excess insurer). But the excess insurer’s expected trial liability 
is $1.5 million (0.5 x $3M = $1.5M) so it would have an economic incentive, 
but not a contractual obligation, to pay more than $0.5 million in order to 
settle.  
With that said, situations in which excess insurers actually would be 
tempted to overpay are more theoretical than real. In practice, excess insurers 
are not eager to settle. Instead, they are the most reluctant insurers to settle.25  
23  The assertion that shareholders are overcompensated in shareholder lawsuits is not 
without controversy. The average settlement for such lawsuits between 2003 and 2008 was $45.1 
million. See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW 
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 22 (2010). Although that 
figure may sound like a lot of money, it represents less than 3% of the average damages actually 
sought in such cases. Id. at 8.   
24  See Squire, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
25  Excess insurers, which receive smaller premiums from the policyholder than the primary 
insurer and may not have any liability until tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of 
underlying insurance has been exhausted, typically are the insurers that are most skeptical 
of the reasonableness of proposed settlements that implicate their policies. Consequently, 
they often refuse to settle and then become the defendants in subsequent coverage 
litigation brought by the policyholder or underlying claimants after the underlying case has 
been settled without the excess insurers’ participation. See, e.g., Michael F. Aylward, Paying 
to Play: What Does It Mean to Exhaust Underlying Insurance, 54 DRI FOR THE DEF., no. 5, May 
2012, at 27, 28–30 (discussing cases where excess insurers have battled in courtrooms for 
years in an effort to avoid paying when the underlying insurance arguably has not been 
exhausted); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV, 
2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007) (describing a policyholder 
who funded over $239 million of defense and settlement costs associated with underlying 
litigation where excess insurers refused to settle and then litigated with its excess insurers 
for over a decade in order to recover the amounts paid in the underlying litigation); 
Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 
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Indeed, they often either do not pay their full policy limits or must be sued in 
order to force them to pay anything. 26   This happens because they often 
disagree with the policyholder’s and/or underlying plaintiffs’ assessment of 
the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial and because of the requirement that 
all of the underlying insurance first be exhausted.27  They also simply do not 
fear the risk of being held liable for more than their policy limits for bad faith 
refusal to settle if a judgment is entered against the policyholder for more 
than the limits of the policyholder’s insurance program.28  This is because 
they know the policyholder, which controls settlement, will settle the case 
before exposing the corporation to an enormous uninsured loss.29  Indeed, 
due to the enormous financial downside of shareholder trials for the 
policyholder and the unwanted negative publicity associated with such cases, 
almost no shareholder cases go to trial.30   
Excess insurers also insist on a discount for their coverage defenses based 
on policy exclusions, such as the fraud and unjust enrichment exclusions, 
which often potentially apply in shareholder lawsuits and become even 
stronger defenses if the case goes to trial and the shareholders are able to 
introduce evidence of the policyholder’s deliberate misconduct and obtain a 
judgment.31  Consequently, because of their coverage defenses and knowledge 
(exhibiting an instance where an excess insurer successfully argued that it was not required 
to pay anything where the settlement with the primary insurer was for less than the 
policy’s full limits). 
26  Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. See also Part III. 
27  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 2006 WL2338045 at *4; Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1034; 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978); Aylward, supra note 25, at 
27, 28–30; BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 167–69, 187; infra text accompanying 
note 42. 
28  Proving an insurer acted in bad faith is not an easy task. Most of the cases in which the 
policyholder successfully proves the insurer acted in bad faith involve more insurer 
misconduct than a simple refusal to accept a reasonable settlement demand within policy 
limits. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (affirming jury verdict of 
bad faith where the insurer, in addition to refusing to accept a settlement demand within 
policy limits, refused to settle even though the policyholder, a 70-year old widow, offered 
to contribute to the settlement and ultimately committed suicide after becoming indigent 
while attempting to satisfy the judgment in excess of the policy’s limits entered against 
her); Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) (affirming jury verdict of bad 
faith in a medical malpractice case involving an injured baby where the insurer refused to 
settle within policy limits due to its corporate practice of trying, instead of settling, all 
“bad baby cases” despite the insurer-appointed defense counsel recommending settlement 
and the presiding trial judge informing the insurer that it was acting in bad faith by 
refusing to settle). 
29  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 142, 167–69, 187. 
30  Id. at 160, 167–69, 187. 
31  Id. at 178-79, 186–90, 198. 
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that policyholders cannot afford to risk an enormous uninsured verdict at 
trial, excess insurers routinely insist upon receiving discounts off their policy 
limits and policyholders effectively have to pay a portion of the various excess 
insurers’ layers of coverage to the underlying claimants in order to settle 
cases.32  Thus, instead of having an incentive to overpay in order to settle 
under the current policy language and laws, 33 more incentives need to be 
created to pressure excess insurers to pay reasonable amounts to settle 
because the existing incentives are inadequate. Awarding the policyholder 
attorneys’ fees if the policyholder is forced to fund a reasonable settlement 
itself and then sue its excess insurers for reimbursement would be an example 
of a way that the law could be changed to encourage insurers to settle.34 
Moreover, even if an excess insurer theoretically were willing to pay more 
to settle than they contractually are obligated to do, the only time it would 
have an incentive to do so is when its expected trial liability plus the limits of 
32  Id. at 10, 143, 179, 198. 
33  Although Professor Squire discusses some of these facts in Part IV of his article, his 
discussion does not reconcile how excess insurers that refuse to settle and/or insist on 
significant discounts off their policy limits based on their coverage defenses and differing 
assessments of the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial are nonetheless forced to overpay 
under “cramdown” settlements. Indeed, he offers the Second Circuit case of Schwartz v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008), as his leading example of a case in which 
a “cramdown” settlement allegedly occurred and the court allegedly overlooked the 
overcompensation hazard that he claims exists under the current policy language and law. 
See Squire, supra note 1, at 65. Instead of being a “cramdown” settlement situation, 
Schwartz is actually an example of why more incentives need to be created to force insurers 
to accept reasonable settlement demands. In Schwartz, the policyholder had $50 million of 
D&O insurance and the insurers refused to offer more than $5 million to settle, which 
forced the policyholder to go to trial. Schwartz, 539 F.3d at 139. Just before the end of 
trial, the policyholder agreed to settle for $20 million without his insurers’ consent. Id. The 
policyholder subsequently sued his insurers for reimbursement and a jury found that the 
insurers unreasonably refused to consent to the settlement. On appeal, the Second Circuit 
held that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Id. at 145. In short, Schwartz is not a 
“cramdown” settlement case. The policyholder settled for $30 million less than the limits 
of the insurance program and the policyholder had to fund the settlement himself. After 
funding the settlement, the policyholder then had to: 1) sue all of his insurers to seek 
reimbursement, and 2) convince a jury and the Second Circuit that the insurers acted 
unreasonably in refusing to consent to the settlement. That is a far cry from a situation 
where the primary and lower layer insurers were coerced by the excess insurers and 
policyholder to accept an unreasonably high settlement demand in order to avoid trial.  
34  See, e.g., WINDT, supra note 20, at § 9:24 (“There are, in short, sound public policy reasons 
for allowing an insured some type of ‘extra’ award when an insurance company 
unreasonably refuses to . . . indemnify the insured, forcing him or her to go to the 
expense of establishing the company's error by means of litigation . . . . The most 
appropriate relief, therefore, when an insurance company has acted unreasonably, is an 
award of attorney's fees.”). 
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the underlying insurance are greater than the policyholder’s expected trial 
liability. That scenario could only arise when the alleged damages are within, 
or do not greatly exceed, the coverage limits and the plaintiffs’ chances of 
success at trial are relatively high. The following formula reveals when the 
temptation to overpay could arise:  
(UL + UI) x P < UL 
Under this formula, UL represents the underlying policy limits, P 
represents the probability of the plaintiffs winning at trial, and UI represents 
the uninsured exposure of the policyholder based on the amount of alleged 
damages that exceed the policy limits. 
Similarly, to put the formula in Professor Squire’s terms where he calls 
the risk of overpayment a “transfer,”35 the formula can simply be stated as 
follows: 
 (UI x P) < T 
Under this alternative formula, UI represents the uninsured portion of 
the damages, P represents the probability of the plaintiffs winning at trial, and 
T represents the amount of the potential overpayment.   
To illustrate the limited circumstances in which the theoretical temptation 
to overpay could arise, consider again Professor Squire’s example that we 
have been discussing. If the alleged damages were increased to $7 million, but 
all of the other assumptions remained the same, then the excess insurer’s 
temptation to overpay would disappear. This is because the policyholder’s 
expected liability would be $3.5M (0.5 x $7M = $3.5M) and the excess insurer 
would be unwilling to pay more than $1.5M (0.5 x $3M) in addition to the 
primary insurer’s $2M in limits to settle. Consequently, the reasonable 
settlement value of the case from the policyholder’s and excess insurer’s 
perspectives becomes the same. 
Of course, in shareholder lawsuits, the alleged damages typically far 
exceed the limits of coverage, even though data comparing the policyholder’s 
total amount of insurance versus the alleged damages is not available. Also, 
the plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial are often relatively low, so the 
temptation for excess insurers to pay more than they are contractually 
obligated to do is not a common occurrence.36  In addition, in the odd case in 
which such a scenario could arise, only the highest layer of coverage 
implicated by the settlement demand would be presented with this temptation 
due to the way corporate insurance programs are structured. This is because 
the policyholder’s expected trial liability must exceed each of the lower layers 
35  See Squire, supra note 1, at 29. 
36  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 142. 
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of coverage before the higher layer of coverage would be obligated to 
contribute anything to the settlement. Thus, it is a phenomenon that would 
only impact the highest layer of coverage in the insurance program.37 
In sum, “cramdown” settlements should not occur under the existing 
policy language and law because only reasonable settlements must be 
accepted, and the reasonableness of the settlement is based on the 
policyholder’s expected liability. Although the risk of overcompensation by 
the highest layer excess insurer theoretically could arise in some very limited 
circumstances, the risk is not created by the contractual or legal obligations of 
the insurers. In practice, excess insurers do not overpay plaintiffs in order to 
settle because of the exhaustion requirement in their policies, their coverage 
defenses, and their differing views regarding the plaintiffs’ chances of success 
at trial. Instead, they resist settling and insist on discounts off their policies’ 
limits in order to settle because they do not face significant downside risks if 
they refuse to settle. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A SEGMENTED SETTLEMENT SCHEME 
 
In this Part, the theoretical solution that Professor Squire sets forth to 
address the alleged problem of “cramdown” settlements and the 
overcompensation of plaintiffs is discussed in two sections. The first section 
discusses the practical and legal problems that the implementation of a 
segmented settlement scheme would present. The second section discusses 
whether the claimed benefits of a segmented settlement scheme – less 
compensation to plaintiffs and lower premiums – warrant changing to such a 
scheme.  
  
A.  The Problems and Complexities Presented by the Implementation 
of a Segmented Settlement Scheme 
 
1.  Practical Problems Associated with a Segmented Settlement Scheme 
 
A segmented approach to settlements would present a number of  serious 
practical problems, some of  which are acknowledged by Professor Squire in his 
article.38  Under a segmented approach, the policyholder and each insurer would be 
allowed to settle separately with the underlying plaintiffs, and the underlying 
37  See infra Figure 1; BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 52–54. 
38  See Squire, supra note 1, at Part IV. 
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plaintiffs would then proceed to trial against the insurers that refused to settle.  
Under such a scenario, the underlying case would be tried against an empty chair – 
the policyholder that settled with a full release.39  Of  course, in shareholder cases, 
much of  the relevant trial evidence would be documents and testimony from the 
directors and officers of  the policyholder, particularly because shareholders need to 
prove that the corporation made intentional, or at least reckless, 
misrepresentations.40 Also remember that one of  the reasons policyholders desire 
to settle shareholder suits is to avoid the negative publicity associated with a public 
trial, including the alleged misconduct of  its corporate management that allegedly 
resulted in the bilking of  the company’s shareholders.41  
With those facts in mind, what incentive would the policyholder have to appear 
at trial after it has settled with a full release?  Since the policyholder has paid to get 
out of  the case when its insurers refused to settle, what incentive would it have to 
cooperate with its insurers during discovery or at trial? 42   Why would the 
policyholder spend time and resources preparing for a trial in which its directors 
and officers would be exposed to cross examination designed to prove that they 
defrauded their own shareholders?  The directors and officers would be confronted 
with every bad document that the shareholders’ counsel could uncover, which 
would then be published in newspapers and televised over and over again.  With a 
lot of  downside and nothing to gain at trial, the policyholder would want nothing to 
do with it. Consequently, the shareholder plaintiffs and non-settling insurers would 
need to subpoena the policyholder’s witnesses and documents, which the 
policyholder would resist with all legal means available. 
39  Cases in which a plaintiff pursues a policyholder’s insurers without the policyholder as a 
defendant in the case are not empty chair cases because such actions typically occur after a 
judgment has been entered against the policyholder or the policyholder has stipulated to 
liability and assigned its insurance rights to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Pruyn v. Agric. Ins. Co., 
36 Cal. App. 4th 500, 515, 522–23 (1995) (noting that so long as the judgment amount is 
reasonable and not the result of fraud or collusion, the policyholder can settle by agreeing 
to the entry of a consent judgment with a covenant not to execute against the 
policyholder where the insurer breached the duty to defend); Ayers v. C & D Gen. 
Contractors, 269 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (same). 
40  See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 32. 
41  See id. at 160. 
42  Under existing law and the current policy language, the policyholder is obligated to 
cooperate with its insurers. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 603–10. If a 
policyholder's failure to cooperate with the insurer materially prejudices the insurer's 
defense of the case, then coverage is forfeited. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 
607–08. Although Professor Squire does not address this issue, presumably that obligation 
also would either be removed or ignored under a segmented settlement scheme because 
the policyholder would be able to act solely in its own self-interest and settle while its 
insurers remained in the case.   
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Further, unless the policy language and case law were changed, the shareholder 
claimants should expect that as soon as some of  the underlying insurers and 
policyholder settle, the remaining insurers would move for summary judgment 
based on current case law that holds an excess insurer’s liability is extinguished once 
the policyholder settles with a full release.43  In addition, the excess insurers would 
likely move for summary judgment based on case law that holds a settlement of  the 
underlying insurance for less than the full policy limits does not satisfy the 
exhaustion requirement of  the policies.44  The non-settling insurers also would 
move for summary judgment on the basis that the policyholder’s failure to 
cooperate in the defense of  the case should result in the forfeiture of  coverage.45  
Finally, with Louisiana being the most notable exception, very few states allow 
43  See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding an excess 
insurer had no liability where the primary insurer settled for less than its full policy limits 
and the policyholder agreed to the entry of a consent judgment, under which the claimant 
could only execute against the excess insurer because the policyholder effectively had 
been released under the consent judgment and had no liability to the underlying claimant 
for which the excess insurer could be liable). 
44  See, e.g., Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1028 (E.D. Mich. 
2007) (finding an excess insurer had no liability where underlying insurance was settled for 
less than the full policy limits); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, 161 Cal. App. 4th 184, 194 (2008) (same). A policyholder, unlike an insurer, 
often is able to successfully argue it has satisfied the exhaustion requirement for primary 
or lower layers of insurance in situations if the loss exceeds the amount of the underlying 
insurance or the policyholder has paid a settlement to the underlying claimant that 
exceeds the limits of the underlying insurance. This is true even if the policyholder settles 
with some of the lower layer insurers for less than the full policy limits before pursuing 
the excess insurers for reimbursement. In such circumstances, the limits of the underlying 
insurance are deemed to have been exhausted because the policyholder has actually 
suffered a loss in an amount greater than the underlying insurance’s limits and/or paid the 
full amount of the limits to the underlying claimant. See, e.g., Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. 
Co., 23 F.2d 665, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (finding that the policyholder satisfied the 
exhaustion requirement in an excess insurer’s policy even though the policyholder settled 
with the primary insurer for less than the full limits because the loss exceeded the full 
limits of the primary policy); Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 
1454 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs., Inc., 356 F.3d 
850, 859 (8th Cir. 2004) (same). 
45  See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 42, at 607–08. Of course, if a policyholder settles with 
the plaintiffs and obtains a full release, then the policyholder would not care whether its 
failure to cooperate results in the forfeiture of coverage under the remaining policies. The 
plaintiffs would, however, care because they would lose that potential coverage if the 
policyholder breaches the duty to cooperate. Nonetheless, due to the inherent conflicts, it 
is hard to imagine a scenario in which the policyholder would be required to cooperate 
with the remaining insurers in their efforts to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims when doing so 
would preserve coverage for the benefit of the very plaintiffs whose claim the 
policyholder is also being asked to help defeat.  
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direct actions by claimants against insurers.46  Consequently, unless numerous laws 
were changed, once the policyholder settles, the remaining insurers likely would 
move for the dismissal of  the case as well.  
In short, as Professor Squire correctly notes, one should not expect 
shareholders, shareholders’ counsel or policyholders to support a segmented 
settlement scheme, particularly where the goal of  the system is to drive down the 
amount shareholders and their counsel recover and to shift more of  the 
settlement’s costs onto policyholders.47  Nor, as is discussed in the next section, 
would such an approach likely be attractive to judges because, instead of  promoting 
settlements, it likely would lead to additional litigation and motions practice in 
situations where the actual defendant in the litigation – the policyholder – is no 
longer even a party. 
 
2. Public Policy Considerations Regarding Segmented Settlements 
 
It also is worth observing that a segmented approach to settlement is 
inconsistent with well-established public policy that favors settlements in 
order to avoid the expense and delay caused by litigation.48  As many courts 
and commentators have noted, “settlements produce a substantial savings in 
judicial resources and thus aid in controlling backlog in the courts.” 49   
Another advantage of settlements is that they provide “greater control over 
the outcome [of a dispute] and its timing.”50  Consequently, settlements enjoy 
46  See, e.g., Mark Mese, Direct Action Statutes, 15 COMPREHENSIVE GEN. LIAB. REP. S520, at 3–
10 (Int’l Risk Mgmt. Inst. ed. 2003). 
47  See Squire, supra note 1, at Part IV. Professor Squire opines that a segmented settlement 
scheme would be beneficial to shareholders because the overall cost to the company 
would be lower under such a system. The plaintiff shareholders nonetheless might not 
endorse such a scheme because one of the scheme’s goals would be to lower the 
compensation they would receive. See Squire, supra note 1, at 41–45. 
48  See, e.g., Margaret M. Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
9, 74 (1996); Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement 
agreements are to be encouraged because they promote the amicable resolution of 
disputes and lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts. In 
addition to the conservation of judicial resources, the parties may also gain significantly 
from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy and complex trial.”) (citations omitted); 
Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We favor 
and encourage settlements in order to conserve judicial resources.”); Miller v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Mont. 2007) (“The declared public policy of 
this State is to encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation. . . . Settlement 
eliminates cost, stress, and waste of judicial resources.”). 
49  Am. Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1060 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
50 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 405 (2009). 
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the enthusiastic support of courts because they help alleviate the congestion 
of court dockets.51 
Although Professor Squire disagrees, 52  if adopted, a segmented 
settlement scheme would discourage settlements and encourage trials because 
insurers would have little reason to settle in many, if not most, cases since 
their potential liability at trial would never exceed their policy limits. Their 
expected liability would also always be lower than the full policy limits unless 
the policyholder’s liability went undisputed. Consequently, if the 
reasonableness of settlements were analyzed on an individual insurer-by-
insurer basis without regard for the overall expected liability of the 
policyholder, and if insurers had no liability for refusing to settle, then 
insurers would have little incentive to settle unless they were offered 
incredible discounts off their policy limits. This is because they would lose the 
investment income they could earn on the amounts paid to settle by waiting 
until a final judgment is entered after a trial. Further, their coverage defenses 
based on the unjust enrichment and deliberate misconduct exclusions may 
completely eliminate their coverage obligation if they wait for a judgment in 
the case, so their incentive to wait for trial would continue, as it currently 
does. In addition, with each insurer independently evaluating the plaintiffs’ 
chances of success at trial, at least some insurers would assess those chances 
differently than the plaintiffs, further increasing the likelihood that some 
insurers would refuse to settle. Thus, a segmented settlement scheme would 
be contrary to the public policy that encourages settlements. 
A segmented settlement scheme also runs afoul of the long-standing 
public policy to enforce contracts and require insurers to honor the terms of 
the policies that they draft and for which they accept handsome premiums.53  
Insurers draft the language in liability policies, which generally are then sold 
on a take-it-or leave-it basis.54  As numerous courts have noted, an important 
51 See Cordray, supra note 48, at 36; see also Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1113, 1191–92 (1990) (noting reasons for judicial encouragement of settlement 
agreements).   
52  See Squire, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
53  See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848–49 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(explaining that public policy favors enforcing the terms of insurance); Nw. Nat’l. Cas. 
Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the 
public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not 
lightly to be interfered with. It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as 
against public policy.”). 
54  See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1072, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); 
Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n 
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public policy that applies to insurance “is that an insurance company which accepts 
a premium for covering all liability for damages should honor its obligation.”55  As 
is discussed above, there are several existing policy provisions that are inconsistent 
with a segmented settlement scheme. Thus, in order to avoid running afoul of  the 
public policy that favors enforcing contracts as written, liability policies would need 
to be redrafted before a segmented settlement scheme could be implemented, 
particularly in light of  the fact that the policyholder has already performed by 
paying the policy’s premium when the issue of  settlement arises. Consequently, the 
entire risk management equation between policyholders, primary insurers and 
excess insurers would also need to be changed. 
 
3.  The Unfavorable Consequences for Policyholders That Would Occur Under a 
Segmented Settlement Scheme 
 
Policyholders, who are seeking to transfer the risk of loss to insurers 
when they buy insurance, would also be unpleasantly surprised by the results 
of a segmented settlement scheme.  Under a segmented settlement scheme, 
the contractual relationship between insurers and policyholders would be 
quite different because the reasonableness of settlements would be measured 
by each individual insurer’s expected trial liability, as opposed to the total 
expected liability of the policyholder. 56  Consequently, unless the 
policyholder’s liability has been stipulated to by the parties, it would never be 
reasonable for the insurer to pay its full policy limits, regardless of which layer 
in an insurance program an insurer sits. This is because it will always have 
some percentage chance at trial for a defense victory or a damage award for 
less than its full policy limits. Thus, under a segmented settlement scheme, 
insurers would be free to reject settlements that are reasonable when the case 
is valued as a whole because there would be no penalty for deciding not to 
some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT 
DISPUTES § 4.06[b] 4–37 (2d ed. 1999) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one 
of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed 
prior to contract formation.”); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to 
Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The 
only part of the standard policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is 
the Declaration Sheet. . . . [T]here is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized 
language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”). 
55  Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987); see also Sch. 
Dist. of Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849; McNulty, 307 F.2d at 444; Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 
568. 
56  See Squire, supra note 1, at 39–40. 
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settle and insurers would never be held liable for more than their policy limits. 
As discussed above, such a scenario would create little, if any, incentive for 
insurers to settle. Consequently, much more of the burden to fund 
settlements would fall to policyholders.  
To really understand the shift in settlement burden that would occur 
under a segmented settlement scheme, consider another scenario that is more 
complex and realistic in shareholder litigation against large corporate 
policyholders. Based on the way damages are calculated in shareholder 
litigation (the number of outstanding shares are multiplied by the movement 
in the stock price caused by the alleged misconduct), 57  assume that the 
policyholder faces a potential liability of $1 billion if the shareholders are 
successful at trial. Also assume that the policyholder’s primary insurance has a 
policy limit of $10 million and the policyholder has additional layers of excess 
insurance for a total of $300 million in insurance coverage.58 Also assume that 
the shareholders have a 10% chance of prevailing at trial, which means the 
policyholder’s expected liability is $100 million (0.10 x $1B = $100M). Finally, 
assume that shareholders are willing to settle for $100 million, the expected 
trial value of the case. From the policyholder’s perspective, not only would it 
be reasonable to settle for $100 million to avoid a potential liability of $1 
billion, it would be indefensible to put $700 million of the policyholder’s and 
$200 million of the insurers’ assets at risk by proceeding to trial when the case  
could be settled for $100 million.  Under the existing policy language and case 
law, the primary insurer and the excess insurers up to the $100 million layer 
of coverage would be required to consent to the settlement because it would 
be unreasonable not to do so. Also, none of the excess insurers above the 
$100 million layer would be asked to contribute anything to settle the case 
because the entire settlement amount is below their layers of coverage. 
Under a segmented settlement scheme where each insurer makes its 
settlement decision without regard to any other party’s interests or the current 
policy language and law, the reasonable settlement value for all of the insurers 
in total would be $30 million (0.10 x $300M = $30M). The policyholder, on 
the other hand, would be required to contribute the other $70 million in order 
to settle the case for the expected trial value of $100 million (0.10 x $1B = 
$100M) even though it has paid premiums for $300 million in coverage. 
57  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 34. 
58  According to Tom Baker’s and Sean Griffith’s study, $300 million is the maximum 
amount of D&O insurance that large corporations currently purchase. BAKER & 
GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 53. 
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In short, this example illustrates why a segmented settlement scheme 
would be extremely unfavorable to policyholders and would be inconsistent 
with the very purpose of insurance – to transfer the risk of loss from 
policyholders to insurers. 
 
B.  Questions Regarding the Realization of the Benefits of a 
Segmented Settlement Scheme  
 
It is questionable whether the principal benefits that a segmented 
settlement scheme are intended to produce – avoiding overcompensation of 
plaintiffs and lower premiums – would actually occur under such a scheme. 
As an initial matter, it is questionable whether plaintiffs are actually 
overcompensated due to the existing policy language and laws, as discussed 
above in Part I. It is also questionable whether premiums would be lower. 
Currently, the premiums charged for primary insurance are much higher 
than the premiums charged for excess insurance.59 Indeed, the higher the 
attachment point of an excess insurer, the lower the premium charged for the 
same amount of limits. This is because the risk being borne by the higher 
layer excess insurers is lower due to the lower chances of a claim reaching the 
higher layers of coverage.60  Because the primary insurer could settle cases for 
far less than its policy limits and would have no risk of being held liable for 
judgments that exceed its policy limits under a segmented settlement scheme, 
the premiums for primary insurance should go down. Conversely, however, 
the premiums excess insurers charge would go up because they would be 
assuming a greater risk now that they would no longer have the benefit of the 
requirements that: (1) lower layers of insurance must be exhausted by the 
payment of their full policy limits, and (2) lower layer insurers must accept 
settlements that are reasonable from the perspective of the policyholder. 
Consequently, the result would simply be a shifting of premium payments 
from primary and lower layer excess insurers to higher layer excess insurers.   
Would there nonetheless be a net savings in premiums for policyholders 
as Professor Squire theorizes?  It is unlikely. As an initial matter, shareholders 
are already only receiving on average less than 3% of their alleged damages in 
the average settlement.61  Thus, there is no reason to believe that shareholders 
would be willing to accept even less to settle cases simply because less 
insurance would be available to settle if the policyholder decided not to 
59  See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21; Marick, supra note 21. 
60  See sources cited supra note 59.  
61  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 8. 
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purchase additional insurance to make up for the lower amount of insurance 
that would be available to settle cases. Consequently, if the policyholder 
purchased additional excess insurance to make up for the lost amount of 
insurance available to settle cases under a segmented settlement scheme, then 
there would not be a net savings in premiums for policyholders. This is 
because the policyholder would be using the premium savings, resulting from 
lower premiums charged by the primary and low level excess insurers, to 
purchase higher layers of insurance in an attempt to replace the “true” 
insurance that would be available to fund the payment of claims. Thus, the 
only way real savings in premiums would occur is if policyholders chose not 
to use the premium savings created by the segmented settlement scheme to 
purchase additional insurance, but instead simply funded more of the 
settlements with money from their own coffers.  Of course, such a result 
would be exactly contrary to the very reason that policyholders buy insurance 
in the first place. There is consequently little reason to think that 
policyholders would choose to become more self-insured simply because the 
rules were changed to decrease the amount of insurance actually available in 
each layer of coverage to settle cases. 
Although Professor Squire favors a scenario in which policyholders 
would purchase higher, thinner layers of coverage,62 such insurance may not 
actually be available to purchase due to the capital requirements for insurers.  
Professors Baker and Griffith uncovered that the highest total amount of 
D&O insurance currently purchased is $300 million.63  Large corporations, 
however, routinely face shareholder lawsuits with alleged damages that far 
exceed $300 million, so the end result of a segmented settlement scheme 
could be that some policyholders would be forced to become even more self-
insured than they currently are.64  Further, common sense dictates that if the 
amount of insurance available to fund judgments were increased, plaintiffs’ 
counsel would demand greater amounts to settle.65 
The discussion above also reveals that one of the primary justifications 
for the implementation of a segmented settlement scheme is predicated upon 
the questionable assumption that corporations are risk neutral or should be 
forced to become more risk neutral. Corporations that purchase insurance, by 
definition, are not risk neutral.  One of the principal reasons corporations 
purchase insurance is to avoid the payment of uncertain future losses. 66   
62  See Squire, supra note 1, at 43.  
63  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 53. 
64  Id. at 142. 
65  Id. at 144–45 (stating the amount of insurance available impacts settlement amounts). 
66  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 10. 
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When a company purchases insurance, it is exchanging a relatively small 
certain loss (i.e., the premium) in order to transfer the risk of larger, uncertain 
future losses to an insurer. 67 If corporations were risk neutral, then they 
would simply self-insure. Indeed, even though Professor Squire acknowledges 
that it would be cheaper to self-insure for many companies because they 
could save the cost of insurers’ profits imbedded in the premiums, most 
companies do not. That, of course, is true for many types of insurance and is 
not unique to D&O insurance.68 
Ultimately, if the goal of a segmented settlement scheme is to make the 
costs associated with shareholder litigation transparent to shareholders by 
forcing corporations to become more self-insured for shareholder litigation, 
then there is a better and more open way of achieving it. Corporations could 
simply be prohibited from purchasing D&O insurance.69 As Professor Squire 
67  Id. 
68  The reasons many corporations are not risk neutral and choose to purchase insurance 
instead of “going bare,” as self-insurance is referred to in the world of insurance, are 
generally beyond the scope of this Response, but a few observations on that front are in 
order. There are tax advantages for corporations that purchase insurance. Corporations 
can deduct premiums as business expenses. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 63. On 
the other hand, a corporation that simply puts aside the funds that would be used to pay 
premiums into a reserve fund to pay claims would not be able to receive a deduction for 
those amounts and the company also would have to pay taxes on the income the reserves 
earned. Id. Insurance also protects against the risk of bankruptcy. Id. at 63–64. In addition, 
many lenders require corporate borrowers to have insurance so corporations that do not 
have insurance incur higher borrowing costs. Id. at 64. Similarly, when a company is 
confronting a crisis that creates an uncertain future due to, for example, allegations of 
corporate misconduct or a catastrophe such as a flood, the company’s ability to raise 
capital is limited and insurance provides a ready source of funds to address such 
situations. Id. at 65. Although less applicable to D&O insurance, many companies also 
purchase insurance for the loss-prevention expertise of insurers that the companies 
themselves lack. Id. at 66. Finally, insurance protects the shareholders’ investments in the 
company by lowering the volatility of a company’s share price by smoothing the 
company’s profits and losses that otherwise would be impacted by the payments of 
settlements and judgments. Id. at 67. 
69  Even though D&O policies contain exclusions that are intended to deny coverage for 
intentional misconduct such as fraud, shareholder lawsuits are carefully crafted to plead 
around such exclusions. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 30, 49. Nonetheless, 
because shareholder lawsuits must be predicated on allegations of deliberate or reckless 
corporate misconduct, a public policy argument against allowing insurance for 
shareholder lawsuits certainly can be made. See id. Although this Response does not allow 
for a fulsome exploration of the argument, for a discussion of the public policies in favor 
of and against allowing insurance for intentional injuries or damages, see generally, 
Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage is Not Available or Allowed 
for Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65 (2012). 
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acknowledges, 70  such a proposal is not novel and it already has  been 
considered and rejected by state legislatures.71 
 
III.  ANALYSIS OF SEGMENTED SETTLEMENTS UNDER OTHER LINES 
OF CORPORATE INSURANCE 
 
Although Professor Squire’s article focuses on D&O insurance, he asserts 
that due to the existing rules regarding insurers’ obligations to settle, the risk 
of unreasonable “cramdown” settlements and overcompensation of plaintiffs 
in lawsuits against corporations may also exist under other lines of 
insurance. 72   Consequently, he suggests that segmented settlements be 
considered for such lines of insurance as well. 73   The case law and my 
experience indicate that there is little risk of unreasonable “cramdown” 
settlements or overcompensation of plaintiffs under other lines of corporate 
insurance.74 
As an example, let us consider the typical experience of a major 
corporation with CGL insurance, a line of insurance that most large 
corporations have. As an initial matter, the policies typically are occurrence-
based, as opposed to claims-made policies like D&O insurance. 75   The 
distinction is important because occurrence-based policies are triggered when 
an injury or damage takes place during the policy period, while claims-made 
policies cover claims first presented during the policy period.76  Thus, claims 
often trigger multiple policy periods under occurrence-based policies, while 
claims typically only trigger a single policy period under claims-made policies. 
As such, a lot more insurance is often potentially available to cover CGL 
claims.77   
In addition, because most large corporations in America are willing to 
bear some risk in order to save on the higher costs of premiums for primary 
and low level excess insurance, their insurance programs often have a 
significant self-insured retention (“SIR”) with only excess insurance above 
70  See Squire, supra note 1, at 64. 
71  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 43–44. 
72  See Squire, supra note 1, at 70, 72–73. 
73  Id. 
74  See supra notes 25–27. 
75  See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 21, at 482–85. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. See also Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance Clause” 
by Another Name, 60 KAN. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2011) (analyzing the complexities in 
determining the amount each insurer should be obligated to pay when a claim triggers 
coverage in multiple years and multiple layers of coverage). 
 
                                                                                                                          
 Virginia Law & Business Review 7:589 (2013) 612 
it.78  Consequently, similar to D&O insurance, the policyholder controls the 
defense and settlement of cases asserted against it. Also, insurers’ obligations 
to pay the defense costs, settlements and judgments arise as indemnity 
obligations, because such amounts are included as covered costs under the 
definition of “ultimate net loss” that insurers agree to pay.79  And, similar to 
the D&O insurance policy language discussed above, the policyholder must 
obtain the consent of the insurer in order to settle, and that consent shall be 
reasonably given.80   
A graphic depiction of three years in a typical corporate insurance 
program for CGL insurance that has a total of $300 million in limits in the 





78  See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Del. 
2010) (analyzing coverage issues for a policyholder that was self-insured for losses up to 
$50 million with excess insurance above that amount); Douglas R. Richmond, Rights and 
Responsibilities of Excess Insurers, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2000) (“Larger businesses 
often self-insure up to some amount, with their self-insured retentions (SIRs) substituting 
for primary insurance.”).  
79  See, e.g., Planet Ins. Co v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 789 F.2d 668, 671 (1986) (finding the 
term “Ultimate Net Loss” is defined as “(1) The sum actually paid or payable in cash in 
the settlement or satisfaction of losses for which the insured is liable either by 
adjudication or compromise with the written consent of the ‘Company’, after making 
proper deduction for all recoveries and salvages collectible, (2) and includes attorney's 
fees, court costs and interest on any judgment or award, (3) but excludes all loss 
adjustment expenses and all salaries of employees and office expenses of the insured, the 
‘Company’ or any underlying insurer so incurred.”). 
80  See, e.g., Fuller-Austin Installation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th 958, 982 
(2006); Taylor v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 978 P.2d 740, 747 (Haw. 1999); Hilco Capital, LP 
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 978 A.2d 174, 179 (Del. 2009); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bear Stearns Cos., 10 
N.Y.3d 170, 177 (N.Y. 2008); RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 10, at § 203:37. 
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Notably, unlike many D&O insurance programs,81 multiple insurers often 
share a single layer of coverage.82 
In order to illustrate how claims are defended and settled under a typical 
CGL program for a corporate policyholder, we will consider two actual 
experiences of DuPont, a Fortune 100 company, which are matters of public 
record.   The first experience involved a products liability case related to an 
acetal resin product known as Delrin.83  It is a case that I ultimately tried on 
behalf of DuPont against the final insurer holdout, Stonewall Insurance 
Company, after a decade of litigation. 
In the Delrin case, DuPont manufactured plastic resin pellets in the 1980s 
that were used by a plumbing manufacturer to create fittings used in 
plumbing systems.84  Years after the plumbing systems were installed, it was 
discovered that the fittings slowly degraded allegedly due to chemical attack 
by elements commonly found in household water such as chlorine. 85   
Consequently, some of the plumbing systems in which the fittings were used 
eventually leaked and caused damage to the homes.86  
Numerous lawsuits were filed on behalf of hundreds of thousands of 
homeowners against various defendants, including the designer and 
manufacturers of the plumbing systems as well as several manufacturers of 
the raw materials used in the systems such as DuPont.87  DuPont had an 
insurance program in the 1980s with a $50 million SIR and excess coverage 
above the SIR in each year, which is very similar to the insurance program 
depicted in Figure 1. 88   Because the claims implicated multiple years of 
insurance, DuPont provided notice of the lawsuits to dozens of its CGL 
insurers in multiple policy years and then kept its insurers apprised of the 
defense strategy as well as potential settlement opportunities during the 
81  BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 23, at 148. 
82  See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co., 996 A.2d at 1255; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV, 2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 
2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 
(Del. 2007); Richmond, supra note 77, at 29.  
83  See Stonewall Ins. Co., 996 A.2d. 1254 (Del. 2010). 
84  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2004). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 933–34. 
88  Id. at 935. 
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course of the litigation.89  Although invited to do so during the course of the 
litigation, no insurer provided any input to DuPont regarding how the cases 
should be defended or whether, and for how much, the cases should be 
settled. Although none of the insurers had any basis to contend that the 
proposed settlements were unreasonable, the insurers neither consented nor 
objected to the settlements that were proposed. DuPont ultimately settled by 
agreeing to pay a 10% share of all the amounts paid by the group of 
defendants to the underlying claimants.90  DuPont’s total costs associated 
with the defense and settlement of the cases exceeded $239 million.91 
While DuPont was spending tens of millions of dollars defending itself, 
the insurers reserved their rights and asserted dozens of defenses to coverage 
that were largely based on arguments that insurers in other years should pay 
instead of them, as opposed to defenses that were based upon arguments that 
the claims at issue were not actually covered under the terms of their 
policies.92  Thus, DuPont was left to fund the hundreds of millions of dollars 
of settlements on its own and subsequently sued its insurers to recover the 
amount it spent to defend and settle the cases. 
The second experience relates to DuPont’s efforts to collect from its 
insurers for its asbestos liabilities. It is another case in which I represented 
DuPont. As was the case with many companies in America, although DuPont 
did not make asbestos-containing products, asbestos was present at some of 
its manufacturing plants. Consequently, DuPont was sued by thousands of 
contractors who allegedly were exposed to asbestos while working at 
DuPont’s plants.93  Similar to the Delrin case, DuPont notified its insurers of 
the underlying lawsuits and kept them informed regarding the defense 
strategy and potential settlement opportunities.  Nonetheless, none of the 
insurers agreed to pay any of the defense costs or settlements, with each 
insurer claiming that other insurers should pay instead.94  As a result, DuPont 
paid millions of dollars to defend and settle the cases over the course of many 
years and then sued its insurers to recover the amounts it had paid, focusing 
89  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 99C-12-253 JTV, 2006 
WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007).  
90  E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 934 (Del. Super. Ct. 
2004). 
91  Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1256  (Del. 2010). 
92  E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 879 A.2d 929, 936–37 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2004). 
93  See Complaint at ¶ 24, E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co., et. 
al., (No. B-0176143) (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Texas, Nov. 23, 2005). 
94  Id. at ¶ 36. 
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its coverage claim on the insurers that had sold DuPont policies from 1967 to 
1972.95  After DuPont defeated the insurers’ motion for summary judgment, 
the insurers finally settled.96 
What are the lessons from these two examples of DuPont’s experience 
with respect to the issues of whether multi-layered towers of insurance lead to 
unreasonable “cramdown” settlements and the overcompensation of the 
underlying plaintiffs?  There are several. 
First, despite the insurers’ obligation to consent to reasonable 
settlements, none of the insurers actually consented to any of the settlements 
even though they ultimately could not successfully contest the reasonableness 
of them.  Obviously, that means the higher layer excess insurers were not 
overly eager to settle, and they did not “cramdown” unreasonable settlements 
on the lower layer insurers.  Nor did any of the insurers feel compelled to 
tender their policy limits in order to avoid being held liable for more than the 
policy’s limits. To the contrary, none of the insurers wanted to settle, not 
because they contended the underlying cases lacked merit or the settlements 
were unreasonable, but rather, principally because DuPont had multiple 
policy years that covered the claims and each of the insurers were hoping 
other insurers would be required to pay in its stead. They also preferred to 
continue holding and investing the premiums paid by DuPont while DuPont 
spent its own money on the litigation.97  Consequently, DuPont had to sue 
them to collect anything and then had to overcome numerous coverage 
defenses that were intended to eliminate, or reduce, the insurers’ coverage 
obligations.  
Second, the existence of a multi-layered insurance program, and the 
purported coercive effect of the legal and contractual obligation of insurers to 
accept reasonable settlements, did not result in the overcompensation of the 
claimants. To the contrary, DuPont and the underlying claimants negotiated 
the settlements without regard to whether DuPont’s insurance would cover 
the settlements because the availability of insurance was uncertain when the 
settlements were negotiated.   
95  Id. at ¶ 28. 
96  See Hearing Transcript at 18, E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. v. Travelers Cas. and Sur. 
Co., et. al., (No. B-0176143) (Dist. Ct. Jefferson County, Texas, Oct. 6, 2006). 
97  See, e.g., Eliot M. Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an 
Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do not simply hang onto 
premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between payment of premiums 
and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] industry is 
particularly important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry 
to remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”). 
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Third, DuPont’s experiences are not unusual. In complex, multimillion 
dollar lawsuits against corporate policyholders, it is quite common to find that 
multiple layers and years of insurance potentially cover the claims and that the 
insurers rarely are eager to settle regardless of which layer of coverage they 
occupy. 98   Indeed, a policyholder must often make settlement decisions 
without any input from insurers and the policyholder must fund the 
settlements itself and later pursue its insurers; thus, collective settlements are 
not pervasive.99  Indeed, collective or segmented settlements would actually 
be an impediment to the settlement process.  Under such a system, instead of 
negotiating with just the policyholder, the underlying plaintiffs would need to 
negotiate separately with dozens of insurers, each of which evaluates the 
underlying plaintiffs’ chances of success at trial differently and expects a 
discount off its policy limits for its coverage defenses.  
In short, under other lines of insurance such as CGL insurance purchased 
by large corporations, there is little risk of either overcompensation to the 
underlying claimants in complex, high stakes litigation, or coercive 
“cramdown” settlements on lower layer insurers due to the insurers’ 
obligation to consent to reasonable settlements. Thus, overcompensation and 
“cramdown” settlements are not pervasive problems that need to be 
addressed by changing the policy language or laws related to settlements. To 
the contrary, although outside the scope of this Response, more incentives to 
induce insurers to accept reasonable settlements need to be created because 





Professor Squire’s article represents a significant advancement in the 
scholarly literature on insurance law. He has coined the previously unnamed 
“duty to contribute” to describe insurers’ obligations to pay the amounts of 
reasonable settlements that implicate their layers of coverage. He also has 
identified a theoretical situation in which excess insurers may have an 
economic incentive, but not a contractual obligation, to overpay the plaintiffs 
98  See French, supra note 77. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 
99C-12-253 JTV, 2006 WL2338045 *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006), aff’d, Travelers 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007); Comerica 
Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Aylward, 
supra note 25.   
99  See sources cited supra note 97. 
 
                                                                                                                          
 Virginia Law & Business Review 7:589 (2013) 618 
in order to settle. He then identifies and discusses a novel solution to address 
this problem, which he calls “segmented settlements.” 
Although there are some very limited circumstances in which an excess 
insurer theoretically might be tempted to overpay despite its contractual 
obligation to only pay reasonable amounts to settle based upon the 
policyholder’s expected trial liability, in practice insurers do not intentionally 
overpay in order to settle. In addition, changing to a segmented settlement 
scheme would create a number of complex, practical problems that are 
inconsistent with some important public policies.  Such a scheme would 
require significant changes to the existing policy language and would lead to 
more trials with “empty chair” defendants. Thus, considering the limited 
theoretical circumstances in which the temptation to overpay could arise, and 
weighing the problems that would accompany a change to a segmented 
settlement scheme against the benefits such a change is intended to confer, 
the scales tip against implementing a segmented settlement scheme. 
 
 
